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In recent times, the pressure on surgeons to publicly
disclose their operative results has increased sharply. In the
UK, the Bristol Heart Scandal and Harold Shipman enquiry
have led to a wider public debate about disclosure within
medicine.
On 8th December 2005 the Scottish Information Com-
missioner ruled that Information Services (ISD) e a division
of NHS National Services Scotland (NSS) e should provide
information on the mortality rates of surgeons in Scotland
from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005. This was in response to
requests by the Sunday Times and Scotsman newspapers
submitted to NSS in February 2005, under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000.
On 27th April 2006, patients were given access to rates
of survival for heart surgery for the first time. The Health-
care Commission and the Society for Cardiothoracic Surgery
joined forces to launch a website with information on
outcomes of heart surgery. The website gives rates of
survival from operations at 30 out of 33 heart units in
England and Wales, with surgeons from 17 of those units
choosing to provide survival rates from their operations. In
the USA, the New York Times has been publishing Operative
Data since 1991. The questions remain: Should operative
data be publicly disclosed? Can such data be risk adjusted?
Can patients understand and make use of the figures? Could1743-9191/$ - see front matter
doi:10.1016/j.ijsu.2006.11.003it lead to discrimination, bias or change the way surgeons
work? A poll of 31 surgeons on theijs.com found that 55%
feel that surgeons operative results should not be published
in the lay press. In following debate, we pose the motion:
‘‘This house believes that Surgeons outcomes should be
published in the lay press?’’, in addition to the points of
view below, please also refer to our correspondence pages
where the discourse continues.
For the Motion
Professor Craig R. Smith, Calvin F. Barber Professor
of Surgery, New York Presbyterian Hospital and
Columbia University Medical Center
The proposition attempts to separate two questions that
are inextricably linked:
(1) Should surgeons track their results?
(2) Should these results be available to the public?
Reasonable disagreement is difficult to imagine with
respect to the first question, so I will build my argument
from there. A ladder of options exists for tracking out-
comes, beginning with an individual surgeon maintaining
a spreadsheet, as many do. One imagines that private self-
assessment will always be honest, although golfers and
fishermen know better. The main benefit is to the surgeon,
who can sleep comfortably in a private bubble, protected
from involuntary disclosure.
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can easily be combined. Accuracy of risk assessment and
outcome recording is no less critical, and perhaps the honor
system is still defensible at this level. In most cases
numbers will be too small to reach important conclusions.
The media will not be very interested, and when alerted by
an Institution, they may smell a self-promotional rat. But
while intramural databases provide a basis for ongoing
quality assessment, the institution will still have no idea
how well it serves its patients compared to any other.
It is not a great leap of imagination to start putting these
spreadsheets together regionally or nationally. The sample
size becomes large enough to support meaningful infer-
ences, provided risk assessment and data entry remain
accurate. Large databases quickly demonstrate the unreli-
ability of honor systems, as the oft-cited experience in New
York State makes clear.1 Once the assembly of data gets to
this level, I submit that we have the answer to the second
question: Any large, regional cardiac surgery database will
find its way into the lay press, regardless of our sensitivities.
Opponents of this view usually understand the value of
regional databases as quality improvement tools, but cannot
understand why the lay press should have access to them.
Consider the following: Heart disease is arguably our most
prominent public health problem. Cardiac surgery is the
most dramatic form of definitive treatment for this impor-
tant condition. Coronary bypass is the most closely analyzed
surgical procedure ever e numbers are large, pathology is
uniform, and the operation lends itself to reproducibility in
a factory-like environment. During the rapid growth phase of
coronary surgery, competition between coronary factories
produced an explosion of advertising claims. These claims
were typically results-based, and frequently centered
around the wizardry of one surgeon or a small group of
surgeons. Cardiac surgeons have rarely been shy about
claiming a place in the pantheon of medical heroes. Enter
the New York State Department of Health, with a rigorous
and mandatory registry. Put it all together, and it was
inevitable that media would want a peek. In more or less
this fashion, the fantasy that individual surgeon’s results
could be protected from disclosure was dashed in 1991 after
three years of clubby contentment. The rankings were front-
page news. Surgeons were apoplectic.2 I wailed as loudly as
anyone else, wallowing in paranoid medical liability fanta-
sies, and waxing self-righteous in the presence of other pro-
fessionals who were not required to read their quality
rankings in the New York Times.
But that was 15 years ago, and the wailing has stopped.
There is abundant evidence that rankings have little impact
on choices. As an officer of the Healthcare and Finance
Administration stated, ‘‘A number of studies indicate that, in
general, patients rank quality information far behind conve-
nience, coverage, access, and cost.’’.3 Public reporting of
mortality results in the Cleveland area did not adversely af-
fect the market share of hospitals with higher than average
mortality.4 A study of the impact of public reporting in New
York and California concluded that ‘‘Volume effects were
modest, transient and largely limited to white Medicare pa-
tients in New York.’’5 In a study of patients in a public disclo-
sure state (Pennsylvania), ‘‘Fewer than 1% knew the correct
rating of their surgeon or hospital and reported that it had
amoderate or major impact on their selection of provider.’’6Does this mean patients are too ignorant to use the tools
at hand? On the contrary, I believe patients have an
instinctive understanding that performance of complex
activities like heart surgery is not reducible to one or two
numbers.
Consider professional sports e despite reams of statis-
tics, consumers (fans, owners, columnists) still pick their
favorites by some kind of gestalt analysis that defies exact
definition.7,8 If we credit consumers with this kind of wis-
dom, it addresses Jerome Kassirer’s lament that ‘‘Before
we use practice profiles of individual doctors for any
purpose, we should be confident that they reflect the full
extent of what doctors do.’’18 It may be uncomfortably rel-
evant to note that athletes hesitate to complain about their
statistics, expecting to be labeled whiners and ingrates if
they do. As a veteran baseball agent put it, you do not
give your player a push by claiming ‘‘This guy hit the ball
hard but it just happened to go at people’’.8
The question remains whether public disclosure makes
surgeons inappropriately risk-averse. Responding to ques-
tionnaire surveys, New York surgeons9 and cardiologists10
declared that risk considerations frequently affected their
judgment. A report from the Cleveland Clinic suggested
that outmigration from New York to Cleveland was in-
creased during the early days of public disclosure in New
York State.11 Moscucci et al.12 asserted that Michigan cardi-
ologists were more willing to perform percutaneous inter-
ventions in shock patients than their counterparts in New
York State. Each of these reports has important weaknesses
that undermine their conclusions, but they are nonetheless
widely cited, suggesting that readers are highly receptive
to the argument.
Why are we so sure that risk avoidance is inherently
detrimental to patients? It is not always clear that aggres-
sive treatment of a given high-risk patient is justified by the
odds favoring a good outcome. Some high-risk patients
recover completely from treatment and enjoy clear bene-
fits (utility). Others die, or survive a lengthy and expensive
recovery damaged or unimproved (futility). Greater respect
for futility e a kind of risk avoidance e might be a good
thing. In the debate over public disclosure, avoidance of
futility is rarely mentioned, in preference for the view that
all risk avoidance is bad for patients.11,12
While on the subject of risk avoidance, consider another
scenario. Suppose a non-disclosure environment allows
a marginal performer to sustain a practice composed
primarily of all the high-risk, low-yield, high-futility pa-
tients that other surgeons in the area avoid. Introduce
public disclosure of outcomes and such a surgeon is likely to
be an outlier. It has been argued that the first few cycles of
public reporting in New York State drove out the outliers.13
Should the specialty respond with quiet acceptance, or
righteous indignation? That may depend on how confidently
we can claim to have policed ourselves prior to public
disclosure.
I do not mean to imply that existing performance
assessments are perfect instruments, which they clearly
are not. This important issue has been well covered by
many others.14,15,16,17,18 The rampant proliferation of
scorecards underscores both the urgency of improving their
quality, and the hopelessness of silencing them. A guide
aimed at journalists who focus on healthcare opens with
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shortcomings in quality are epidemic.’’ The authors
proceed to mention 27 different healthcare quality assess-
ments available to enterprising journalists, without even in-
cluding The Society of Thoracic Surgeons, New York State,
or the other three States that publish cardiac surgery
outcomes19!
In short, it is time to face the real world. Protection
from lay access to our outcomes is not an option. We
must work to improve the quality of information used to
judge us, but we cannot insist on secrecy until the perfect
yardstick is developed.
Against the Motion
Mr. David Rosin, General Surgeon, St Mary’s Hospital
and Imperial College School of Medicine and Immediate
Past Vice-President of the Royal College of Surgeons of
England
There is a clamour from our Lords and Masters for
surgeons to make known their mortality, morbidity and
outcome data. In the wake of Bristol, Shipman, and others
it is not surprising. Indeed most surgeons would be pleased
to have the real data at their finger tips and would probably
be prepared to share it IF the data was true/correct and
more importantly, a fair reflection once risk stratification
had been taken into account. There is a strong belief that
the Department of Health would merely use the raw data
(a) for their own purposes and (b) as a stick with which to
beat us.
Surgeons should not participate for the following
reasons:
1. The information presented in the Excel tables used in
the study of surgeons in Scotland is taken from the
reports that Information Services Division release confi-
dentially to individual surgeons and medical directors.
It does not count individuals but episodes of care of
patients (continuous period in hospital under a particu-
lar consultant). This leads to duplication, as often more
than one consultant is involved with the management.
2. Many patients under a surgeon may NOT undergo an
operation or procedure.
3. Some surgeons have patient episodes recorded under
anaesthetists, e.g. in ITU.
4. Many of the lines of data have small numbers of epi-
sodes and deaths.
5. The tables are taken from e SCRIPS. The system was
never intended for public scrutiny, as they are so diffi-
cult to interpret.
6. Some surgeons will not have been practicing for the
whole year making the figures incorrect.
The figures are taken out of context and without good
background knowledge. The information is NOT reliable
about a surgeon’s performance. There are three main rea-
sons as well as others:
 Increased death rates occur if the patients are iller,
older, emergencies, or patients who require more com-
plex or higher risk treatment. New treatments may lead to an increase in mortality
and morbidity, compared to those doing routine work.
 If surgeons deal with only small numbers of cases, the
mortality rate may differ greatly from year to year ow-
ing to random statistical variation.
Other reasons
 Surgical performance is only one factor that influences
outcome.
 Some cases attributed to surgeons may have only been
under their care briefly.
 Data of this kind cannot be guaranteed to be free from
inaccuracies.
 If the cardiac data are suggested as being an example,
one must realise that the information for these case
was collected specifically for audit purposes and
funded outwith the Department.
 Evidence is present that publication of data can act
against the public interest.
So where does that leave us e between the devil and the
deep sea. If we publish we are damned; if we do not publish
we are doubly damned. Let us consider cardio-vascular
disorders e a progressive, often self-inflicted process. The
population who come to operation have a poor genetic
make-up commonly with a strong family history of heart
disease. Most likely they are hypertensive. Many will suffer
from Diabetes Mellitus and virtually all of them have a life-
long history of smoking.
Let us take an example e a patient presents to a vascular
surgeon with early skin changes in the leg due to large
vessel disease unsuitable for minimal access intervention.
There is a past history of coronary artery bypass grafting
and previous episodes of transient-ischaemic attacks. After
the usual investigations and fully informed consent, a fem-
oro-popliteal-posterior tibial bypass is performed. On day 1
an embolectomy is necessary. On day 2 revision of the graft
lower anastomosis is carried out. Two days’ later ischaemic
changes occur and are treated conservatively. By day 5
a below-knee amputation is necessary and performed. Five
days’ following this, an above-knee amputation is carried
out. Just as the patient is recovering a further myocardial
infarction occurs at two weeks and a coronary artery has to
be stented. Finally, the patient develops a deep vein
thrombosis in the other calf. Depressing but a not impos-
sible scenario. The surgeon has to publish his morbidity,
which for just this one case is horrendous and is not the
fault of the surgeon but of the disease. So the surgeon is not
at fault but the public’s conception in reading his statistics
is that he or she was the cause of all the problems.
Any why is it always the surgeons who are targeted? Why
are not more people saved from myocardial infarctions?
How come bed sores, deep vein thromboses and infections
are not subject to published data from physicians? General
Practitioners are paid more than Consultants and they are
not audited in the public eye. The missed malignant
melanoma, headaches that turn out to be meningitis, etc.
All can be just as disastrous as surgical outcomes.
The National Health Service financially is creaking. Add
a hike in defensive medicine and the bill for more
sophisticated investigations will treble. £15 billion has
been spent on a new IT system yet already in the pilot
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publishing data e could we trust it. No. Would it be risk-
stratified e unlikely.
There is no doubt that publishing raw data would lead to
selective and defensive surgery. The figures would probably
be meaningless without risk stratification and proper
interpretation.
Reply to Dr Craig Smith
Dr Smith made some passionate pleas to publish surgical
results in the lay press. His arguments are based only on
cardiac surgery, and once again on one operation within
this specialty. This operation of coronary artery bypass
grafting has a well-defined and easy to assess outcome e
either better health or death. He argues that it is inevitable
that results would be published but I believe this can be
checked if the profession published its data and outcomes
by Societies, Associations or Colleges. No one would wish to
stifle the ground-breaking publications collected on various
medical/surgical subjects by NCEPOD. However, surgeons
and anaesthetists gave their results by numbers and each
poor outcome was adjudicated by experts.
Risk stratification cannot be robustly introduced yet,
and may never be possible in some of the larger specialties.
Therefore e DATA collection, YES; League Tables e NO. The
public press will always choose to highlight the poor
performer. ‘‘Good surgeon’’ does not make headlines. For
this reason, if for no other, we must stem the mood to pub-
lish all data publicly. It cannot and is not, correctly inter-
preted and the press make sure of that with banner
headlines on the negatives.
Dr Smith has drawn attention to defensive surgery being
performed and would appear to endorse it. How sad.
Patients will only be operated upon if they are a good
risk. Hardly one of the hippocratic ideals.
Dr Smith argues the publication in the American press
made no difference to patient choice in terms of choosing
hospitals or surgeons. The American public are probably
better informed. The United Kingdom public would recoil in
shock/horror to find that 50% of their surgeons are below
average.
We must resist in feeding the public press frenzy for
‘‘negative and anti-news’’. By all means we should check
data and this should be made available to primary care
practitioners who are the gatekeepers for admission to
secondary care, and it is they who should be informed, not
the public by sensational press league tables.
Mr. David Rosin
Reply to Mr. Rosin
Mr. Rosin says ‘‘Surgeons should not participate’’ and lists
14 points to support his position. Setting aside for the
moment details of the argument, it is simply unrealistic to
promote non-participation, as Mr. Rosin admits with the
comment ‘‘.if we do not publish we are double-damned.’’
As regards Mr. Rosin’s 14 points, with one exception they
cogently target issues of data quality and risk adjustment. I
must take exception to the 14th point, which states‘‘Evidence is present that publication of data can act
against the public interest.’’ I assume he refers to the
argument that public disclosure creates risk aversion that
might deny treatment to high-risk patients. As I hope my
discussion of this point made clear, this issue is far too
controversial to summarize with ‘‘evidence is present.’’ I
will add to the evidence a very recent analysis of the
experience in New York State,20 which found that approxi-
mately 20% of bottom-quartile surgeons relocated or
stopped practicing within two years of the release of
each report card. While this is exactly what some surgeons
fear, guardians of the ‘‘public interest’’ might argue that
‘‘publication of data’’ was an effective feedback mecha-
nism that gradually eliminated poor performers. The au-
thors support Mr. Rosin’s other 13 points with their
conclusion that ‘‘The large impact on practicing physicians
underscores the need for highly accurate reporting.’’
Even though 15 years have passed, I can remember how it
felt to face public disclosure for the first time, and I feel the
collective pain of British surgeons. I will humbly offer two
observations. First, surgeons have a responsibility to be
highly engaged in the design and evolution of the reporting
system to address the many valid concerns about data
quality that Mr. Rosin has raised. Second, British surgeons
can take advantage of 15 years of experience with large,
regional databases such as the New York State CSRS to begin
their own system standing on a highly evolved platform.
Finally, Mr. Rosin laments the ‘‘public’s conception’’
that the surgeon is personally responsible for all bad
outcomes. As I have already discussed, relying partly on
a sports analogy, I give the public more credit. Adding to
a sizable body of evidence already cited, the recent study
mentioned above found no impact of report card perfor-
mance on hospital market share.1
Dr Craig R. Smith
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